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Abstract
In this paper we study the effects and transmission of fiscal policy in a dynamic general
equilibrium sticky-price model with non-Ricardian agents, distortionary taxation and a
Walrasian labor market. We derive a simple analytical framework for fiscal policy similar to
the workhorse 'new synthesis' model widely used in the monetary policy literature. We then
explore theoretical conditions under which government spending (whether financed by
lump-sum or income taxes) can increase private consumption as observed in the data. We
conclude that making the model fare better in this respect necessarily makes it fare worse in
what concerns real wage fluctuations. Additionally, we show that the model can generate
non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy when participation to asset markets is limited enough
and the monetary policy rule is passive.
JEL classification: E32, E62 
Keywords: Fiscal Policy; Dynamic General Equilibrium; Distortionary Taxation; Sticky
Prices; Non-Ricardian Agents; Government Debt; Non-Keynesian Effects.
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1 Introduction
An increase in government spending on goods and services aﬀects macroeco-
nomic variables. While this claim is largely undisputed, there is an active de-
bate around two questions, broadly: ’What are the direction and magnitude of
these eﬀects?’ and ’How is the shock transmitted and what channels are key?’.
This paper is intended to contribute to this debate.
Empirical studies have found a set of relatively uncontroversial results. Gov-
ernment spending shocks tend to increase consumption, hours and output, and
this is robust across diﬀerent studies, concerning diﬀerent countries (see e.g.
Blanchard and Perotti 2003, Perotti 2002, Fatas and Mihov 2001, Mountford
and Uhlig 2001, Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles 2002).1
Theory fails to account for some of these findings (most importantly, the
positive response of private consumption and the positive correlation of con-
sumption and hours worked). RBC models do predict a positive multiplier on
output, but also invariably predict a fall in consumption; this is due to a neg-
ative wealth eﬀect making the household work more (hence the multiplier on
output) and consume less. The mechanism is diﬀerent across models, most no-
tably as a function of the type of taxation, but the negative wealth eﬀect is
always found to be the dominating force. Fatas and Mihov (2002), studying a
larger menu of financing options including distortionary taxation and deficits,
and considering a large span for the labor supply elasticity, find an invariable
fall in consumption2. A quote from King and Rebelo’s 2000 Handbook article
(p.42) also speaks of the diﬃculties of the RBC approach: "Shocks to govern-
ment spending cannot, by themselves, produce realistic patterns of comovements
among macroeconomic variables". Instead, the empirical findings seem to sup-
port older views of the ’multiplier’ whereby fiscal policy, by stimulating demand,
would lead to an increase in both consumption and output3. While this holds
for a balanced budget experiment (the ’Haavelmo multiplier’), it is amplified if
spending is deficit-financed, which is what Keynes was explicitly referring to in
the famous passage in Book 3, Chapter 10 of the General Theory (Section VI).
One way to bring the model closer to the data along this dimension was
suggested recently by Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (henceforth GLV 2002),
building on a proposal of Mankiw (2000). Mankiw argued, based on empirical
evidence from both estimated Euler Equations and the distribution of wealth in
the US, that not all agents behave as predicted by the neoclassical paradigm,
for either they do not have the means (i.e., they are constrained) or they are not
willing to do so. He argued that any model purported to analyze fiscal policy
1A diﬀerent approach is taken by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2001).
2A positive correlation between consumption and hours does obtain with distortionary
taxes, but both would actually fall (as would output), due to intertemporal substitution. This
causes even more embarassement to the RBC model.
3 I ntroducing monopolistic competition and sticky prices helps to get a positive real wage
response, but not a positive consumption response. In that case there is a demand eﬀect
making firms who cannot adjust prices want to sell more, and hence demand more labor. But
this is not enough to compensate the negative wealth eﬀect (see Linnemann and Schabert
2003).
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incorporate a distinction between ’savers’ (neoclassical, Ricardian households)
and ’spenders’ (agents with no non-human wealth living paycheck-to-paycheck),
and sketched a few implications this would have4. GLV(2002) incorporate this
type of heterogeneity into a New-Keynesian model of the business cycle with
monopolistic competition, staggered pricing, lump-sum taxation and investment
adjustment costs, and find that government spending can lead to an increase
in priovate consumption. Specifically, this happens when the demand eﬀect
dominates the negative wealth eﬀect, the government spending shock is deficit-
financed and hours worked are (demand-) determined by an arbitrary wage
schedule, while hours across the two groups are restricted to be equal at all
times. Medium-scale general equilibrium models used for policy analysis and
forecasting at institutions such as Central Banks and the IMF also recently
incorporated the distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents, tes-
tifying to some extent its success.
Our paper is closest to (and can be seen as building upon) the approach
of GLV 2002. We study the conditions under which a standard model with
heterogeneity and distortionary taxation can account for qualitative features
of the data. Our approach is diﬀerent in three main respects. First, we use
an optimization-based, Walrasian labor market. In contrast to Gali et al., we
do not restrict fluctuations in hours across groups to be equal at all times,
and hence total hours to be (demand-)determined by an ad-hoc wage schedule.
Indeed, we emphasize labor market fluctuations’ role in the propagation of fiscal
shocks; this is in line with previous studies of fiscal policy and business cycles
(e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum).
Secondly, we study a larger menu of taxes. A common assumption in many
studies of the eﬀects of government spending is that unlimited lump-sum taxes
are available to finance spending5. While this is only assumed on the grounds of
simplification and could be justified implicitly by assuming very large collection
costs (or high probability of tax evasion) for income taxes, it is plainly unreal-
istic. A large fraction of the total revenues is given by income taxes; moreover,
eﬀective tax rates vary over time as documented i.a. by Mendoza, Razin and
Tesar (1996). Our framework capture this realistic feature of budgets. In par-
ticular, it is consistent with what Baxter and King (1993, pp 316-317) argue
to be an appropriate description of budgetary dynamics in the US. Looking at
Figure 1C therein, one concludes that after the 1970’s, the increase in income
tax rates was larger than that of tax revenue as a fraction of GDP, the diﬀerence
being accounted by transfers (one also sees there an increasing trend in both
tax rates and total tax receipts).
Thirdly, the way we model heterogeneity is slightly diﬀerent. In GLV, as in
Mankiw, part of the agents do not accumulate any physical capital and hence do
not smooth consumption. We abstract from capital accumulation, and model
the diﬀerence between households as coming from limited participation to the
asset market. As in e.g. Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (2002), a sub-set of agents
4However, Mankiw’s paper is silent about the eﬀects of government spending.
5Exceptions include i.a. McGrattan 1994, Ludvigson 1996, Fatas and Mihov 2002.
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does not participate to asset markets and hence will fail to smooth consump-
tion. The main advantage of this simplification is that it allows us to derive
many results analytically and to be transparent about the mechanism at work.
Notably, we are able to reduce our model to a canonical form in inflation and an
appropriately defined output gap, easily comparable with the workhorse ’New
Synthesis’ models used for monetary policy analysis. Of course, this simplifica-
tion implies one limitation: we cannot study the eﬀect of government spending
on investment. However, since the major puzzles in the literature are related
to the response of consumption, real wage and hours, we think the benefits
outweigh this cost6 .
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First is methodological: we derive
a simple ’new synthesis’ model incorporating consumer heterogeneity and dis-
tortionary taxation and nesting the ’workhorse’ model as a special case. Second,
we study the model’s ability to qualitatively fit the data, and the role played
by various modelling features in doing so. Our results indicate that in order to
obtain a positive response of consumption (and a positive correlation of con-
sumption and hours), three features make a big diﬀerence: the persistence of
the spending shock should not be very large; price stickiness should be high;
the response of monetary policy should be accommodative enough. With dis-
tortionary taxation, relatively more stringent conditions are required to grant
the same result.
Our results draw a cautionary signal. In models in the class studied here,
a positive response of consumption can only be driven by high enough fluc-
tuations in the real wage. However, this implies a failure of such a model to
comply to Lucas’ less famous Critique (in Christiano and Eichenbaum’s 1992
terminology). Lucas (1981, pp 226) states that "observed real wages are not
constant over the cycle, but neither do they exhibit consistent pro- or counter-
cyclical tendencies. [...] any attempt to assign systematic real wage movements
a central role in an explanation of business cycles is doomed to failure." Since
RBC models driven (exclusively) by productivity shocks predicted a too pro-
cyclical real wage, shocks to government spending have naturally been thought
of as an additional source of fluctuations reducing procyclicality of wages. As
emphasized by e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) their negative eﬀect on
the real wage (by shifting the labor supply curve) may counteract the positive
eﬀect of technology shocks, leading to a roughly acyclical real wage. The class
of models analyzed here attempts to obtain a positive response of consumption
by a strong enough response of the real wage, which goes against these earlier
studies: if technology and government spending move the real wage in the same
direction, having both as possible sources of fluctuations would only amplify the
implied real wage fluctuations. Moreover, the empirial conditional response of
real wages to government spending shocks (e.g. Fatas and Mihov 2002) is also
small, positive but insignificant. Other features seem to be needed to explain
a positive response of consumption, while complying with Lucas’ litmus test
6Moreover, a diﬀerent framework seems to be necessary for understanding investment dy-
namics and its relationship with fiscal and moentary policy - see Basu and Kimball 2003.
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and with evidence on the conditional response of wages to government spending
shocks.
Additionally, our framework hints to an alternative theoretical explanation
for the observed non—Keynesian eﬀects of fiscal policy as described e.g. in Per-
otti (1999). The main message of this literature is that in specific periods,
fiscal consolidations driven by spending cuts have expansionary eﬀects on con-
sumption and output. In our model, under low asset market participation and
passive monetary policy rule (a non-Ricardian economy), the impulse response
functions of our model are in line with these empirical results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3
we derive the canonical form of our model and discuss the determinancy prop-
erties under diﬀerent parameterization. We presents the diﬀerences, discussed
in detail in Bilbiie (2003), between what we call Ricardian and non-Ricardian
economies. Section 4 discusses the importance of the labor market for the trans-
mission of the shocks for the lump-sum and the distortionary tax case. Section 5
contains numerical simulation of the model and its successes and failures in cap-
turing comovements in the data. Section 6 briefly explores the model’s ability
to generate non-Keynesian eﬀects of fiscal policy, and section 7 concludes.
2 ANon-Ricardian Sticky-Price Model with Dis-
tortionary Taxation
The model we use draws on Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003), being a stan-
dard cashless dynamic general equilibrium sticky price model with Calvo-Yun
pricing, augmented for the distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian
households. There is a continuum of households, a single perfectly competitive
final-good producer and a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate-
goods producers setting prices on a staggered basis. There are also two policy
authorities. A monetary authority sets its policy instrument, the nominal in-
terest rate. A fiscal policy authority purchases the consumption good, raises
lump-sum and income taxes and issues nominal debt. The model is diﬀerent
from GLV in a few important respects, as detailed in the introduction above7.
Two other diﬀerences are: (i) a slightly diﬀerent utility function, necessary for
being able to consider diﬀerent Frisch elasticities of labor supply while being
consistent with the same steady-state hours worked; and (ii) a free parameter
governing increasing returns to scale in the intermediate-goods sector (set to
zero in GLV), which when set properly insures there are no long-run profits,
as documented i.a. by Rotemberg and Woodford 1995 (see appendix A for the
derivation of the log-linearized equilibrium).
7We have studied numerically a version of the model with capital accumulation subject
to adjustment costs.The conclusions being largely robust, this extension did not justify the
increase in complexity. For the sake of space and clarity we stick to the version without
investment.
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2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households [0 1]  A 1 −  share is represented by
standard, neoclassical, ’Ricardian’ households, who smooth consumption being
able to trade in all markets for state-contingent securities. The rest of the
households on the [0 ] interval are labeled as ’non-Ricardian ’.
2.1.1 Ricardian Households
Each saver  ∈ [1−  1] chooses consumption, asset holdings and leisure solving
the following standard intertemporal problem (we drop the  index as we look
at the representative saver):
max
∞X
=0
 (+ 1−	+)
:  ( 1−	) = ln + 

(1−	)1−
1− 
subject to the sequence of constraints:
 ≤  + (1−  )	 + (1−  ) −  − 
An  subscript stands for ’saver’, i.e. a Ricardian household, and  ( ) is
saver’s momentary felicity function, which takes the form considered here to be
consistent with most DSGE studies8.  ∈ (0 1) is the discount factor, 
  0
indicates how leisure is valued relative to consumption, and   0 is the coeﬃ-
cient of relative risk aversion to variations in leisure.  	 are consumption
and hours worked by saver (time endowment is normalized to unity),  is the
nominal value at end of period t of a portfolio of all state-contingent assets held
by the Ricardian household, except for shares in firms.  is beginning of pe-
riod wealth, not including dividend payoﬀs. Profits are rebated to these agents
only as dividends  - that is to say that Ricardian households own the firms.
We distinguish this from the rest of the assets since we do not model the equity
market explicitly; we find the assumption of Ricardian households receiving the
profits realistic since (i) the forward-looking behavior of firms modeled later
would be hard to square with the static behavior of non-Ricardian households;
(ii) we will use the stochastic discount factor of Ricardian households to value
future income streams in the profit-maximizing pricing decision of firms.
Absence of arbitrage implies that there exists a stochastic discount factor
Λ+1 such that the price at t of a portfolio with payoﬀ +1 at t+1 is:
 =  [Λ+1+1] (1)
8This function is in the King-Plosser-Rebelo class and would lead to constant steady-state
hours.
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The riskless gross short-term nominal interest rate  is a solution to:
1

= Λ+1 (2)
Substituting the no-arbitrage condition (1) into the wealth dynamics equation
gives the flow budget constraint. Together with the usual ’natural’ no-borrowing
limit for each state, this will then imply the usual intertemporal budget con-
straint:

∞X
=
Λ ≤  +
∞X
=
Λ (1−  )	 +
∞X
=
Λ (1−  )
−
∞X
=
Λ (3)
Maximizing utility subject to this constraint gives the first-order necessary and
suﬃcient conditions at each date and in each state:

 (+1)
 ()
= Λ+1
+1


 (1−	)− = (1−  )
1



along with (3) hold with equality (or alternatively flow budget constraint hold
with equality and transversality condition ruling out overacummulation of assets
and Ponzi games be satisfied: lim
→∞
 [Λ++] = 0) Using (3) and the
functional form of the utility function, the short-term nominal interest rate
must obey:
1

= 
·

+1

+1
¸
2.1.2 Non-Ricardian Households
Non-Ricardian consumers also optimize. We prefer to think of these households
as not participating to asset markets, either due to constraints or to their being
shortsighted (case in which their optimal asset holdings are zero). One obvious
generalization could treat these agents as saving a fixed (insensitive to interest
rates) portion of their present income - it will become obvious that this would
not change our results qualitatively. The problem these agents face then looks
finally as a period-by-period one:
max

ln + 

(1−	)1−
1− 
: ; = (1−  )


	; −  (4)
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The first order condition is:

 (1−	)− = (1−  )
1
;


(5)
It is important to observe that given this optimal choice, we can solve for
reduced-form (functions only of 	
 and exogenous processes) expressions for
; and 	;. There is no need to keep consumption (or marginal utility of
income) of  constant, as this does not depend on saving decisions or any other
intertemporal feature. Hours will be a solution to:
(1−	)−
·
(1−  )


	 − 
¸
=
1−  




and then consumption will track the real wage to exhaust the budget constraint.
Note that due to the very form of the utility function, hours are constant for
these agents when there are no lump-sum taxes or transfers,  = 0: the utility
function is chosen to obtain constant hours in steady state, and this agent is
’as if’ she were in the steady state always. In this case labour supply of non-
Ricardian agents is fixed, no matter   as income and substitution eﬀects
cancel out.
2.2 Firms
The firms’ problem is completely standard - see Gali (2002) or Woodford 2003
(one generalization is in the production function of intermediate goods).
2.2.1 Final Good Producers
The final good is produced by a representative competitive firm .The aggregation
technology for producing final goods is of the CES form (constant elasticity of
substitution ):
 =
µZ 1
0
 ()
−1
 
¶ 
−1
(6)
Final goods producers behave competitively, maximizing profit each period:
max[ −
Z 1
0
 ()()) (7)
where  is the overall price index of the final good,  () are the prices index of
the intermediate goods. The demand for each intermediate input and the price
index can be shown to be:
() =
µ
 ()

¶−
 (8)
 =
µZ 1
0
 ()
1− 
¶ 1
1−
(9)
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2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
We assume that the intermediate firms face a technology which is linear in labor,
for simplification:
() =
½
	()−  ()  if 	()   ()
0 otherwise
 () is a firm-specific fixed cost: this will be a free parameter that can be chosen
such that profits are zero in steady state and there are increasing returns to scale,
consistent with evidence by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). Alternatively, if
the fixed cost is zero, there are steady-state profits (which is the case in GLV).
We shall encompass both cases. Cost minimization taking the wage and the
rental cost of capital as given implies the following conditions (written as relative
factor demands and nominal marginal cost):


=


(10)
When fixed cost is zero, () is a constant returns to scale function, and there
will be positive steady state profits. When positive and properly chosen, there
will be increasing returns and no profits in steady-state. The (nominal) profit
function is given by:
 () () = ()()− (() +  ())
2.2.3 Price setting
Following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) intermediate good firms adjust their
prices infrequently. The opportunity to adjust follows a Bernoulli distribution.
We define 
 as the probability of keeping the price constant. This exogenous
probability is independent of history. Thus each period there is a fraction of
firms that keep their prices unchanged. The dynamic program of the firm is
(maximizing discounted sum of future nominal profits, hence using the relevant
stochastic discount factor Λ+ used as pricing kernel for nominal payoﬀs):
max

()

∞X
=0
(
Λ+ [()+()−++()]
subject to the demand equation (at  + ! conditional upon price set ! periods
in advance):
+() =
µ
()
+
¶−
+ (11)
The optimal price of the firm is then found as usually as a markup over a
weighted average of expected future nominal marginal costs:
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  (") = (1 + #)
∞X
=0
$++ (12)
$+ =

Λ+
³
1

+
´(1−)
+

P∞
=0 


Λ+
³
1

+
´(1−)
+
In equilibrium each producer that chooses a new price () in period t will
choose the same price and the same level output. Then the dynamics of the
price index given the aggregator above is:
 =
³
(1− 
)  ()
1− + 
−1 ()
1−
´ 1
1−
(13)
The combination of this two conditions leads in the log-linearized equilibrium
to the well known New Keynesian Phillips curve given below. Profits will also
be equal across producers, and equal to:
 =
µ
1− 

¶
 −



2.3 Monetary policy
The monetary authority follows an instrument rule. We consider a simplified
version of the Taylor rule where the short-term nominal interest rate is a function
of expected inflation 9:
 = 
·

+1
+1
¸
(14)
2.4 Fiscal policy
The fiscal authority purchases consumption goods (%) (using the same aggrega-
tor as the household and hence using the same price level for deflating nominal
quantities), raises distortionary and lump-sum taxes (a negative lump sum tax
L is a transfer) and issues debt (+1) consisting of one-period nominal discount
bonds, paying 1 unit at the beginning of next period. The government budget
constraint has the following form,
+1

=  +  [% −   − ] (15)
For debt dynamics, we need to specify a deficit rule, i.e. to what extent is
an exogenous shock to government spending financed through taxes and debt
respectively. The last equation in the fiscal sub-system should then specify how
tax revenues’ dynamics is composed of lump-sum and distortionary taxes.
9The reason why we focus on this simplified rule lies in the fact that the conditions of the
inverted Taylor principle, that occurs potentially in the presence of non-ricardian agents, are
particularly simple.
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2.5 Market Clearing
Market clearing and aggregation require:
	 = 	 + (1− )	 (16)
 = (1− ) (17)
 ≡  + (1− ) (18)
 +% =  (19)
Last equality (goods market clearing or economy resource constraint) holds by
Walras’ law, if we consider that state-contingent assets are in zero net supply, as
is the case since markets are complete and agents who can trade are identical.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 The IS-AS System
In the following we will present the linearized equilibrium dynamics of our model
economy. All derivations are detailed in the Appendix. First we express every-
thing in terms of aggregate variables and then reduce the system to get dynamics
only in terms of output, inflation and interest rate. We first solve for hours and
consumption of non-Ricardian as a function of after-tax real wage and lump-sum
transfers:
& = ( −% ) 
' + 
( (20)
) = [1− * ( −% ) 
]' − *
( (21)

 ≡ 1
1−  + * (1−% )
Note that non-Ricardian agents have a standard labor supply function, where
elasticity ( −% ) 
 is determined by the budgetary structure and preferences
(this is diﬀerent from GLV). Note that hours are positively related to the real
wage as long as   %  which is consistent with US data (see discussion in
Introduction and Figure 1). The parameter * plays a special role: it dictates the
relative extent to which the eﬀect of taxation is accommodated through labor
supply or consumption (e.g. when * is low, consumption tracks real wage to a
greater extent, and the wealth eﬀect goes mainly to the labor supply). Using
these expressions, we can derive (see Appendix) the equilibrium wage-hours
locus WN, which will play an important role in understanding the transmission
of fiscal policy:
	 :
µ
*+
1 + #
1−%
¶
& = ' +
1
1−%
+ (22)
We can now have a relationship between forward-looking part of aggregate de-
mand and total aggregate demand, i.e. we express consumption of Ricardian
agents as a function of output:
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) = ,- + .( −
1
1−%
[. ( −% ) + 1] + (23)
where , ≡ 11− −*

1−
1
1+ +. ( −% )
³
1
1− + *
1
1+
´
and . = 1−*
 We
can further write this equation such that we emphasize that government spend-
ing has an eﬀect on its own and one through the mismatch between spending
and taxes +− ( = + -+  where  is the budget deficit implicitly defined
here as deviations from steady state output. Substituting this we have:
) = ∆- − . − .  +
1
1−%
[. (1− )− 1] +
where ∆ ≡ , − . The presence of non-Ricardian agents aﬀects the link be-
tween the forward-looking part of aggregate demand ) and total aggregate
demand - via two channels: (i) a ’slope eﬀect’, changing the elasticity savers’
consumption to total output10 ; and (ii) a ’shift’ eﬀect, making deficits and gov-
ernment spending matter beyond resource absorption. This eﬀect goes through
the influence of lump-sum taxes on non-Ricardian consumption and hours. Note
that these eﬀects are higher, the higher are  and * (and hence the higher is
.) They are absent exactly when Ricardian equivalence holds, namely when
either  = 0 or * = 0 The former is the standard case where all agents are
Ricardian. The latter point is somewhat more subtle: when * = 0 labor supply
is infinitely elastic, and consumption is independent of wealth, so the economy is
’Ricardian’ regardless of the magnitude of  Notice that only lump-sum taxes
(and not the tax rate directly) have an eﬀect on this equilibrium relationship,
since it is ( that directly influences consumption of non-Ricardian agents. The
tax rate merely appears here because we have emphasized the eﬀect of deficits
separately.
The system can now be reduced to a representation in terms of output,
inflation and fiscal variables (as in the baseline new-Keynesian model). As
discussed in detail in appendix D, the AS curve of the model has the following
form:
/ = /+1 + 0- − 1
1
1−%
+ + 1
1
1−   
where 0 = 1
³

1+ +
1
1−
´
, 1 = (1−)(1−) , % =

 and * =
h

1−
i
To
derive this equation we used the log-linearized pricing equation of the firms and
the log-linear relationship between marginal costs, real wage and distortionary
taxes 2) = 3 = ' + 11−  , where ' is the after tax real wage. Notice that
the AS-curve is not aﬀected by the share of non-Ricardian agents11 . In contrast
10This can change the sign of the coeﬃcient - for details see below and Bilbiie (2003), where
empirical evidence for such cases is also presented.
11This is not a general result, but is due to assumptions making steady-state consumption
shares equal across groups (namely, a fixed costs in production equal to steady state markup
such that steady state profits are nil; and  = 0 such that there is no steady-state interest
income). Changing one of these assumptions would be suﬃcient to make the output elasticity
of inflation dependent on the share of non-ricardian agents.
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to the baseline sticky price model, there is a trade oﬀ between output and
inflation stabilization. This is due to the tax rate acting like a cost push shock,
i.e. increasing the gross wage requested by households12. For the derivation of
the IS-curve, we used (23) in the loglinearized Euler equation of the Ricardian
household to get:
- = -+1 −∆−1 (4 −/+1)− .∆−1 [+1 − ]− .∆−1 [ +1 −  ]
+
1
1−%
[. (1− )− 1]∆−1 [++1 − +] (24)
We decomposed the eﬀect of government spending on output in an direct and
indirect channel (through the deficit). This gives us an indication how the chosen
fiscal rule (i.e. the chosen path for the fiscal deficit) is aﬀecting the demand for
output. As noticed before, the model collapses to the standard Ricardian case
when either  or * are zero. We now seek to reduce the model further and write
dynamics in terms of gaps of variables from some ’notional’ levels defined below,
to facilitate comparison with a standard sticky-price framework. For this, we
need to explore the details of the budgetary structure.
3.2 The fiscal rule and debt dynamics
Under the assumptions we made, debt dynamics is particularly simple. Namely,
it is independent on whether prices are sticky or not, and on what type of tax-
ation is being used. To see this, combine the government budget constraint,
definition of deficit and deficit rule (all variables except for tax rate are devia-
tions from SS as fractions of SS output; tax rate is in deviations from steady-
state value; 5 gives the extent of deficit financing: when it is zero, spending is
entirely deficit-financed, when it is one it is tax- financed).
6+1 = 6 + + − ( − - −   (25)
 = + − ( − - −   (26)
 =
¡
1− 5
¢
+ − 56 (27)
What we obtain is a diﬀerence equation dictating debt dynamics:
6+1 = 
−1 (1− 5) 6 + −1
¡
1− 5
¢
+ (28)
As long as fiscal policy is locally Ricardian (in the sense of Woodford 1996),
i.e. under −1 (1− 5) 7 1 this equation can be solved backward. This gives a
unique path of debt as a function of the entire history of the exogenous spending
process and the initial, given level of debt 60.
6 =
£
−1 (1− 5)
¤
60 + 
−1 ¡1− 5¢ −1X
=0
£
−1 (1− 5)
¤
+−1− (29)
12 See also Benigno and Woodford 2003 for a similar Philips curve, although taxation is at
firm level on sales.
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Note that the debt process will be more persistent, the more the fiscal authority
resorts to deficit financing, and the less it responds to debt. But debt dynamics
are independent of the degree of price stickiness and distortionary taxation, as
long as the initial level of debt 60 is the same under all scenarios13. Consequently,
from the deficit rule, 51 deficit dynamics features the same property. This is a
result of two simplifications: (i) the steady-state level of debt is zero: otherwise,
inflation and nominal interest rate would matter for debt dynamics, and these
are diﬀerent depending on price stickiness and degree of tax distortion; (ii) there
is no ’stabilization motive’ of fiscal policy in the deficit rule (27): otherwise, the
’output gap’ (defined below) would matter for the gap between debt levels under
diﬀerent scenarios. These simplifications are minor for the message of our paper.
All foregoing results are independent of the particular taxation scheme adopted,
i.e. how is the burden of additional spending shared between changes in the tax
rate and changes in lump-sum instruments. While reality is most probably a
convex combination of the two, we will consider two extreme cases. Note, from
the discussion above, that the only diﬀerence between dynamics of lump-sum
taxes and tax rates will come from the diﬀerent response of output under the
two scenarios14. This is discussed further below.
3.3 The eﬃcient and the natural level of activity and gap
dynamics
In the following we discuss the properties of the natural and the eﬃcient level
of activity in our model with non-Ricardian agents under diﬀerent taxation
schemes (see appendix F and G for detailed derivation of the equations). Fol-
lowing Woodford (2003, Ch. 6), the natural level of activity is the level of
activity prevailing under flexible prices. This level of activity is not necessary
always the eﬃcient., i.e. the welfare optimizing level of activity. For example, in
a new-keynesian model with sticky prices only, the eﬃcient and the natural level
of activity coincides only if one ensures that the price mark up generated by mo-
nopolistic competition is oﬀset by a distortionary tax. Under this circumstances
the monetary authority that is committed to complete stabilization of the price
index is welfare optimal. However, complete stabilization of inflation ceases to
be optimal, even when this applies that aggregate output should perfectly track
the equilibrium level of output under flexible prices, if the gap between the nat-
ural and eﬃcient level is not constant. This is the case if government spending is
financed by distortionary taxation. Consequently, we define the eﬃcient level
of activity (denoted with a star) as that prevailing when prices are flexible
and lump-sum instruments are available to finance government spending (case
13To see this, denote the level of debt under the alternative scenario (i.e. with flexible
prices, with lump-sum taxation only, or with both) as ˜ and the gap between actual level and
this level as  =  − ˜, where dynamics of this are given by +1 = −1 (1− )  Under
locally Ricardian fiscal policy,  = 0 is the unique solution if we assume 0 = 0
14Note, however, that the consequences for equilibrium dynamics of the two types of taxation
are radically diﬀerent, even in the absence of automatic stabilization (i.e.  = 0).
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in which the natural and the eﬃcient level coincide)15. In the eﬃcient level
we have 2) =   = 0 and using the wage-hours locus WN and the production
function we have:
-∗ = + (30)
where  = 1
1+
1−	
1−

 As this equation makes clear, when steady-state consump-
tion share are the same for both agents, potential output is the same as in the
case of no non-Ricardian agents. Hence, the presence of these agents only af-
fects output insofar as prices are sticky. This is not the case for the Wicksellian
interest rate, defined as:
4∗ =
·
∆ +
1
1−%
(. (1− )− 1)− .
¡
1− 5
¢¸ ¡
8 − 1
¢
+ + (31)
+.5
£
6∗+1 − 6∗
¤
This is diﬀerent from the natural interest rate obtained in the Ricardian economy
(. = 0) since for any . and for a given level of output and consumption of non-
Ricardian agents, a diﬀerent interest rate path is required to make intertemporal
choices of Ricardian agents consistent with optimality.
Given these definitions, we are able to define the dynamics of our system
when only lump-sum instruments are available (  = 0) as a function of
inflation, interest rate, Wicksellian rate of interest and the output gap.
9 = 9+1 −∆−1 (4 −/+1 − 4∗ ) (32)
/ = /+1 + 09
Note that we have used the properties of debt dynamics described in the previous
section: debt is an exogenous process, and it matters only insofar as it modifies
the Wicksellian interest rate. The system 32 has the form familiar from recent
research in the monetary policy literature; most notably, exogenous government
spending shocks influence the eﬃcient output and Wicksellian interest rate.
The only modifications are: (i) elasticity of aggregate demand to interest rate
is changed; (ii) the shock to government spending has a diﬀerent eﬀect on the
Wicksellian interest rate, as can be seen from 31.
When lump-sum taxes are not available (( = 0) all spending is financed
via distortionary taxation, and since the automatic response does not match
government spending the tax rate will have to vary. The natural level of
activity (denoted with subscript ’n’) is found as:
- = + − 
1−%
1−  

 = -
∗
 − 
1−%
1−  


15Notice that the equilibrium is actually still not eﬃcient in levels since the distortinary tax-
ation in the steady state continues to generate a gap from the welfare optimal equilibirum. But
since this gap is constant, reproducing the former equilibrium is still optimal. Consequenly,
we call the discussed equilibrium eﬃcient in the described sense.
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As discussed before, under these conditions there is a gap between the eﬃcient
and the natural level of activity, coming from variations in the natural tax rate,
which is also an endogenous variable. We can use the deficit rule at the natural
equilibrium  = 5+ + 56

 − - to get16:
 =
5 − 
1−  1−1−
+ +
5
1−  1−1−
6∗ (33)
- = -
∗
 − 
¡
5 − 
¢
(1−% )
1−  −  (1−% )
+ − 
5 (1−% )
1−  −  (1−% )
6∗
Similarly, we can express the natural interest rate as a function of the eﬃcient
interest rate as:
4 = 4
∗
 −
·
,
1−%
1−  + .
µ
1−  1−%
1− 
¶¸ £


+1 − 
¤
Finally, note that the deviations of the tax rate from its natural, flex-price level
(the ’tax gap’) are proportional to the output gap with respect to the natural
level, 9 = - − - :
  −  = −9 (34)
Using the above, the canonical form of the model under endogenous tax rate
variations is:
/ = /+1 + :9

 (35)
9 = 9

+1 − ,−1 (4 −/+1 − 4 )
where : = 1
³
;− 1−
´
The presence of distortionary tax rate variations, com-
pared to the lump-sum case, modifies two things beyond changing the natural
level of activity: (i) slope of NPC (decreasing elasticity to output gap) and (ii)
slope of IS curve, decreasing (in absolute value) elasticity of aggregate demand
to real interest rate (unless the tax rate is zero, case in which , = ∆). This also
modifies determinacy properties as discussed in the next section.
Finally, since we were able to express ’natural’ levels under distortionary
taxation as functions of ’eﬃcient’ levels and exogenous shocks, it is useful to
write the dynamic system in terms of gaps of actual levels from these ’eﬃcient’
levels. This ensures comparability of reduced-form dynamics under the two
diﬀerent taxing schemes. The output gap relative to the eﬃcient level in terms
of the output gap relative to the natural level is:
9 = 9

 − 
1−%
1−  

 (36)
16Recall that the natural level of debt is equal to the eﬃcient level of debt and to the actual
level of debt, as argued previously, +1 = 
∗
+1 = +1.
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We can then write the system having as shocks the eﬃcient interest rate and
the natural level of the tax rate:
/ = /+1 + :9 + :
1−%
1−  

 (37)
9+1 = 9 + ,
−1 (4 −/+1 − 4∗ ) + ,−1.
µ
1−  1−%
1− 
¶£


+1 − 
¤
This shows the specific way in which propagation of shocks is diﬀerent (along
with diﬀerences in coeﬃcients):
a. shocks to tax rate under flexible prices act as cost-push shocks in the
AS curve when output gap is defined with reference to the eﬃcient level; this is
independent of the share of non-Ricardian agents.
b. expected changes in tax rates under flexible prices act as shocks to the
IS curve; this is true only in the presence of non-Ricardian agents.
Finally, note how Ricardian equivalence fails with distortionary taxation
even when . = 0 (e.g. when only Ricardian agents are present). Government
debt still aﬀects the real allocation through its impact on the natural tax rate
33.
3.4 Equilibrium determinacy discussion
As discussed in detail in Bilbiie (2003) the key parameter to look at is the
sensitivity of aggregate demand to the real interest rate. In the standard new
Keynesian model this is equal to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
the Ricardian agents (which is equal to one under log utility in consumption).
However, given the introduction of fiscal policy and non-Ricardian agents this
parameter modifies, and depends on the taxation scheme adopted. Under lump-
sum taxation, the relevant elasticity is ∆ ≡ 11− − . (1− )
³

1− +
1+
1+
´
If
∆ 7 0 (i.e. for high  and/or *) we end up in an economy where a real interest
rate increase has a positive eﬀect on aggregate demand. In this case, the equi-
librium wage hours locus WN is less upward sloping than the aggregate labor
supply curve. This is what we will call later a non-Ricardian economy. This
changes the necessary conditions for equilibrium determinacy significantly. We
show in the appendix that in a reasonably calibrated non-Ricardian economy,
the monetary authority should behave according to an Inverted Taylor principle
to ensure determinacy of the equilibrium. If ∆  0, we end up in a Ricardian
economy where the Taylor principle holds in a standard way. Under distor-
tionary taxation the relevant elasticity is ,  ∆ ≡ , − . and the slope of the
aggregate labor supply curve is accordingly lower (labor supply more elastic),
hence it is harder to end up in the non-Ricardian case. Moreover, the slope of
the AS curve : may become negative too17. This changes determinacy condi-
tions, but for reasonable parameterization the modification is minor and does
not alter the main message.
17However, this requires a tax rate larger than any empirically plausible value.
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In summary, in this section we have shown how a sticky price model incor-
porating limited participation to asset markets and distortionary taxation can
be cast in a form similar to standard models. With lump-sum taxation, the
eﬀects of government spending go through their impact upon the eﬃcient (flex-
price) levels of output and interest rate, as in the standard framework (see e.g.
Woodford 2003). Diﬀerences come from: (i) how government spending shocks
influence these ’notional’ eﬃcient levels; (ii) the elasticity of aggregate demand
to real interest rates. With distortionary taxation, two further diﬀerences arise:
(i) the tax rate under flexible prices  occurs as an additional shock important
for dynamics; (ii) the elasticities of both aggregate demand to real interest rate
and inflation to output gap are changed. While this gives us a compact way of
characterizing dynamics, it may tell little about the mechanism underlying the
eﬀects of fiscal policy at a more ’micro’ level. This is what we try to describe
next.
4 Inspecting the mechanism
4.1 The labor market
In the following we will discuss how a government spending shock is transmitted
in our framework, under diﬀerent financing schemes. The purpose is to under-
stand intuitively the role of each feature in the transmission of fiscal policy; we
will then perform simulations to assess quantitatively the potential importance
of each channel. Following a long tradition in the fiscal policy literature (es-
pecially the RBC literature - see e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992), we
emphasize the role and study closely the details of the labor market. Note that
this mechanism is completely absent from GLV, as discussed at the end of this
section.
First, we outline the properties of the labor supply curve and the equilibrium
wage-hours locus independently of the financing scheme. Later we will discuss
the mechanism under two extreme cases of lump sum and distortionary taxa-
tion only. The equilibrium wage-hours locus labeled WN is derived by taking
into account all equilibrium conditions (for detailed derivation we refer to the
appendix):
	 : ' =
µ
*+
1 + #
1−%
¶
& −
1
1−%
+ (38)
 : ' =
* 11−
(1 + . ( −% ))
& −
.
(1 + . ( −% ))
( +
1
(1 + . ( −% ))
)
Crucial to the response of all variables is the response of real wage and hours
to a government spending shock. Generally, in standard models with Ricardian
agents only, the main channel through which a non-productive fiscal shock is
influencing the economy is the wealth eﬀect. Ricardian agents feel poorer after
a spending shock, by the present discounted value of taxes. This depresses
consumption of goods and leisure and generates a downward pressure on the
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real wage. If prices are sticky, there is also a labor demand eﬀect. Since firms
face an increase in demand but some of them are not able to reset their price,
they increase production. This generates an upward pressure on the real wage.
Now the question arises which eﬀect dominates if we introduce non-Ricardian
agents in the new-keynesian set up and whether this is suﬃcient to get a positive
response of aggregate consumption. Note that the WN curve will always shift
right after a shock to government spending and this shift is independent of the
share of non-Ricardian agents (again due to our assumption of no profits and
no debt in the steady state). But the LS curve will also shift right. An increase
in real wage would come about if: (i) the shift in LS is small enough and (ii)
LS is inelastic enough.
On the latter point, we know that the labour supply elasticity depends on *
and  The choice of these parameters can be as high as allowed by preserving
the Taylor Principle, i.e. preserving a slope of WN larger than that of LS (for
a discussion of the determinacy conditions see appendix or Bilbiie 2003). But
note that the reduced-form slope now depends on the reaction of taxes ( since
these respond to output. This will be discussed in more detail below when we
consider the eﬀects of diﬀerent financing schemes.
On the former point, the shift in LS is made of two components. One is the
’wealth eﬀect’ on non-Ricardian agents generated by lump-sum taxes (second
term on right-hand side of LS). The size of this eﬀect depends on the taxing
scheme adopted. Note that this eﬀect (given a magnitude of () is weaker, less
non-Ricardian agents there are, and more elastic is labor supply (lower .). Since
the smaller shift in labor supply means a more likely real wage increase, this
partial eﬀect goes against what might be thought at first glance: that more non-
Ricardian agents make it generally easier to obtain an increase in real wage. The
second shift in labor supply comes from the standard eﬀect on Ricardian agents
(shift in )) and depends on the following things.
1. The persistence of the shock 8: the more persistent the shock is, the
higher is the wealth eﬀect and the larger the shift, which makes it less
likely to get the increase in real wage.
2. Response of monetary policy to inflation 5: when government spends de-
mand increases, so some firms will increase prices. This generates inflation
and an interest rate response response by the monetary authority. If the
response is strong (i.e. the increase in the real interest rate is strong), the
Ricardian agents will prefer to postpone consumption by intertemporal
substitution. Lower is 5 the lower is this eﬀect.
3. Price stickiness <: this is related to the previous eﬀect, higher price stick-
iness makes the increase in inflation smaller, and hence the potential in-
crease in real rate is smaller18;
18Both b. and c. have another interpretation, namely that the demand eﬀect of government
spending is reinforced.
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4. Intertemporal path of taxation: the impact response depends on the degree
of deficit financing 5 and the response of deficits to debt 5 (i.e on the
underlying fiscal policy rule). To see the impact of the chosen fiscal policy
rule we solve for the implicit tax process using the debt process found
before 29 by abstracting from automatic stabilization (the quantitative
eﬀect of this is generally small) If debt starts from steady state 60 = 0 the
implied process for the tax item that does the adjustment (say = = (  
respectively) is generally, from = = 5+ + 56 :
= = 5+ + 5
−1 ¡1− 5¢ −1X
=0
£
−1 (1− 5)
¤
+−1− (39)
The tax increase depends on the degree of deficit financing and debt re-
action. The combination of 5 and 5 will matter not only for the impact
response, but more importantly for the dynamics and persistence of the
implied tax process and hence of all variables. Lower 5 today means
smaller tax response today (lower weight of contemporaneous +), but
higher in the future (higher weight of history of process). How fast will
the tax increase is dictated by 5 A higher 5 means that the implied
debt process will be less persistent, so the implied tax process will be less
persistent ceteris paribus. Hence, the wealth eﬀect on Ricardian agents is
smaller when the response to debt is higher, since it is the present value
of future taxes that matters for Ricardian agents.
5. Financing scheme: lump-sum taxation and distortionary taxation have
diﬀerent eﬀects. We now elaborate on the last two points.
4.2 Lump-sum taxes
Consider first the case when government spending is financed by lump sum taxes
only. The absence of distortionary taxation means that the after tax real wage
is equal to the real wage ' = 3 By combining the fiscal rule with the definiton
of deficit and setting   = 0 we get:
( = 5+ + 56 −  (1 + #)&
Substituting this into the labor supply curve:
 : 3 =
* 11− + . (1 + #)
(1 + . ( −% ))
& −
.
(1 + . ( −% ))
5+
− .
(1 + . ( −% ))
56 +
1
(1 + . ( −% ))
)
First, the slope of the labor supply curve is higher than in 38 due to auto-
matic stabilization (the sensitivity of lump-sum taxes to hours). This helps,
ceteris paribus, to get a positive response of the real wage after a government
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spending shock. The second and third term come from the eﬀect of taxation
on non-Ricardian agents. Deficit financing (lower 5) decreases the shift in
the labour supply curve directly through the impact on non-Ricardian agents
(smaller wealth eﬀect). A lower response to debt (5) also decreases the wealth
eﬀect by the same channel since taxes increase less on impact. However, the
path of taxation (given by 39, replacing = with () matters for consumption of
the Ricardian agents (last term). In order to get an impact increase in the real
wage (a smaller wealth eﬀect) we need a high enough extent of deficit financing
and a strong enough response to debt. The former makes the tax response lower
for the first few periods, while the latter ensures that the present discounted
value of future taxes (relevant for wealth eﬀect on Ricardian agents) is smaller.
However, note that this is only about the impact response. Since taxes will have
to increase in the near future, after which they are expected to decrease, one
will expect the negative wealth eﬀect to dominate the response of consumption
- this will indeed be the case, as we show when studying the quantitative eﬀects
below.
4.3 Distortionary taxes
Consider the other extreme whereby there is distortionary taxation only, where
the tax rate evolves according to:
  = 5+ + 56 −  (1 + #)&
The equilibrium after-tax real wage decreases when the tax rate increases. This
net decrease needs to be compensated now by the shifts in the two curves for an
increase in the after-tax real wage to obtain. Since ( = 0 the wealth eﬀect on
non-Ricardian agents is absent, but tax rate generates substitution for Ricardian
agents.
 : ' =
* 11−
(1 + . ( −% ))
& +
1
(1 + . ( −% ))
)
Beyond what happens to the after-tax real wage, the shift in LS is exclusively
due to the eﬀect of tax rates on Ricardian agents19 . As shown above, the
dynamics of   obey (abstracting from automatic stabilization):
  = 5+ + 5
−1 ¡1− 5¢ −1X
=0
£
−1 (1− 5)
¤
+−1−
The tax rate dynamics matter beyond the simple wealth eﬀect due to their
impact on the intertemporal allocation of consumption, leisure and hours by
Ricardian agents. Ricardian agents postpone work for periods when taxed less
and enjoy more leisure in periods of high taxation. But this also means that they
transfer consumption to periods of higher taxation of labor. This substitution
19This is one way to see that with distortionary taxation, there is no wealth eﬀect without
intertemporal substitution.
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eﬀect on consumption works in the opposite direction of the wealth eﬀect; which
eﬀect will dominate depends on the particular parameterization considered. The
crucial parameters for the influence of tax rates on the intertemporal allocation
are the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply * and the deficit
rule parameters.
Finally, notice that even a strong increase in (after-tax) real wage and there-
fore a strong increase in consumption of non-Ricardian agents does not en-
sure that aggregate consumption responds positively to a government spending
shock. An increase in the real wage implies a strong increase in marginal cost
(countercyclical markup) and hence a fall in profits, so a further decrease in
consumption of Ricardian agents. This last eﬀect is stronger the higher is the
ratio of Ricardian agents in the economy and the more inelastic labor supply
is. So a strong increase in real wage does not grant an increase in aggregate
consumption and needs to be complemented by other features. For instance in
GLV, wages and hours are not determined by optimization and market clearing.
Instead of a labor supply decision, a ’generalized wage schedule’ is postulated
that relates total hours to the real wage. Moreover, hours are taken to be equal
across the two types of agents at all times and states. Given wealth heterogene-
ity, we see no obvious reason for shutting oﬀ one potentially informative (and
perhaps plausible) channel of implied behavioral heterogeneity, namely the re-
sponse of hours worked to taxation. Indeed, we emphasize the labor market and
real wage determination as crucial for the transmission of fiscal policy.
5 Impulse Responses after a Government Spend-
ing Shock
In the foregoing we have discussed channels for the transmission of government
spending shocks (and the implied tax dynamics). We now try to assess their
relative importance quantitatively. We shall study separately the two financing
schemes. We start from the deterministic steady state and assume that govern-
ment is purchasing one unit of the final good (hence, we shock the + process
accordingly). We then study the dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables
as dictated by either 32 or 37 for the lump-sum and the distortionary tax case
respectively. Since 32 and 37 are canonical forms20, having found a path of
output gap and inflation the paths of the other variables are easily found.
For each of the two financing schemes, we study the relative importance of
some parameters for the response of the economy to a spending shock. We con-
sider a baseline parameterization, and then vary one parameter at a time. We
group parameters or which this exercise is carried in three classes: (i) parame-
ters crucial for the slope of aggregate demand (and for the diﬀerence of slopes
between LS and WN) such as * and ; (ii) fiscal policy rule parameters 5 5
and (iii) other parameters, namely the monetary policy response to inflation 5
20To be rigorous, in the canonical form the interest rate is also substituted using the interest
rate rule.
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the shock persistence 8 and the price stickiness parameter <. The reason why
we study these last parameters separately is, as the alert reader would expect,
that they are crucial for a positive response of private consumption to obtain. In
the baseline parameterization we use the following parameter values. The price
stickiness parameter < is set to 0.75. The steady state tax rate  equals 03The
share of government spending in total output % = 02 Both the fixed cost pa-
rameter  and the steady state mark up are equal to 02 The time preference
rate  equals 099. The persistence parameter of the government spending shock
is set to the value of 09. In the benchmark case we set the inverse elasticity
of labor supply * to 2 (such that Frisch elasticity is 0.5)The deficit response to
government spending (1-5) is equal to 088, while the response to debt 5 is
set to 03 For the described parameter values, the real interest rate elasticity
of aggregate demand is positive if the share of non-Ricardian agents is larger
that 04275 . Therefore we set first the share of the non-Ricardian agents 
to 04 and the response coeﬃcient of the monetary authority 5 to 15; since
the Taylor principle is a good policy guide in this case, this ensures equilibrium
determinacy.
The first set of experiments in Figure 1 compares the baseline parameteri-
zation with two alternatives in which * and  are varied respectively. Limits
to the choice of both * and  are dictated by the desire to preserve the pos-
itive slope of aggregate demand. Since for the baseline parameterization we
are already close to the threshold, the variations consider a lower share of non-
Ricardian agents  = 0 and and infinitely elastic labor supply * = 0. Under the
baseline parameterization, a positive impact response of private consumption
is possible, although this only lasts for two quarters. Thereafter, consumption
decreases. We can explain this using the mechanism described in the previous
section. Since under the baseline parameterization the slopes of LS and WN
are not very diﬀerent, an increase in the real wage requires a small shift in the
LS curve. This is the case here since there is a high degree of deficit financ-
ing and a high response to debt. Consumption increases on impact because of
the strong increase in real wage making consumption of non-Ricardian agents
dominate that of Ricardian agents. However, since the implied tax process is
hump-shaped, once taxes increase the non-Ricardian agent starts to work more
and enjoy less leisure and consumption, while the Ricardian agents’ fall in con-
sumption is persistent (for permanent income reasons). This makes aggregate
consumption fall, reaching a minimum value where the tax process reaches its
maximum. Output and inflation increase, since both hours and real wage go up.
When the share of non-Ricardian agents tends to zero, as in the ... graph, the
response of the real wage is much lower. Consumption falls unambiguously and
the multiplier on output is lower than one (this depends on labor supply elastic-
ity). The real wage does increase but by much less despite the shift in LS being
smaller, since the diﬀerence between the slopes of WN and LS is higher. This
leads to a smaller response of hours also, and hence a smaller multiplier on out-
put. When labor supply is infinitely elastic, consumption and the real wage do
not move. Note that in this case, as argued before, consumption is independent
of wealth and all wealth eﬀect is accommodated through labor supply (by both
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agents) . Hence, the shift in the WN curve is along the horizontal LS curve, and
hours and output increase proportionally to the spending shock. Consumption
does not move (only because there is no capital), no inflation results and output
is at its eﬃcient level. We interpret this first set of experiments as showing that
if one wants to explain a positive and persistent response of private consumption
(as seen in the data at least for some periods) one needs to look elsewhere than
at labor supply elasticity and share of non-Ricardian agents.
Figure 2 considers variations in the second set of parameters (concerning the
deficit rule). We consider respectively a high 5 = 1 and low 5 = 003 (since in
the baseline parameterization 5 is ’low’ and 5 ’high’). As anticipated in the
discussion of the role of the fiscal rule, in both cases there is a smaller increase
in real wage with respect to the baseline. A smaller degree of deficit financing
(higher 5) implies that taxes are raised earlier and debt does not accumulate.
This induces a higher wealth eﬀect, so a higher shift in LS with respect to the
baseline. The real wage still goes up, but consumption falls (the multiplier on
output is less than unity). With a low response to debt 5 = 003 debt is allowed
to accumulate for a long period, and taxes go gradually from low to persistently
high values (pretty much the opposite of the balanced-budget case). The real
wage increases by slightly more than in the balanced-budget case, since the
wealth eﬀect on non-Ricardian agents is largely absent. Recall, however, that
the wealth eﬀect on Ricardian agents is stronger in this case, since the present
discounted value of taxes that they face is higher. The relative importance
of these eﬀects on the two groups determines the relative magnitude of the
real wage response. In the two parameterization considered, it happens that
the responses of output, consumption and inflation are largely the same; but
it should be clear that the mechanism underlying them is completely diﬀerent
and relies upon an ’internalization’ by Ricardian agents of the reaction of the
non-Ricardian through their taking into account of future taxation.
In Figure 3 we present variations in the third set of parameters with respect
to the baseline, namely: a smaller monetary policy response to inflation 5 =11
but not small enough to generate indeterminacy; a smaller persistence of the
government spending shock 8 = 08 (large enough to be empirically implausible,
see e.g. Finn 1998); a slightly higher price stickiness parameter < = 08 (well in
line with some estimates, e.g. Smets and Wouters 2003). As already anticipated
when ’inspecting the mechanism’ (see points 1 to 3), all these variations make
the response of the real wage higher, and consequently consumption is higher,
and the positive response is more persistent. This happens since a lower 8
means a smaller wealth eﬀect on Ricardian agents, while both lower 5 and
higher < reinforce the demand eﬀect of government spending (see discussion in
previous section). Only a combination of these three variations can lead to a
positive and persistent aggregate consumption response.
In Figures 4 to 6 we report exactly the same experiments where government
spending is financed by distortionary taxation21. Generally this set of exercises
21Notice that output gap is defined this time as deviation from the eﬃcient and not from
the natural level of output (which were equal in the last set of experiments).
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shows that it is less likely to get a positive response of aggregate consumption.
The main reason is, as discussed in the previous section, that the after tax
real wage response is generally lower under distortionary taxation. Indeed, for
variations in the first two sets of parameters (figures 4 and 5), the real wage
actually decreases in most cases, since the shift in the LS curve induced by
the wealth eﬀect on Ricardian agents is high enough to oﬀset the shift in the
WN curve, and the substitution eﬀect. The only exception is the case whereby
the debt response is low, case in which the real wage increase for the first few
quarters, since Ricardian agents face a low tax rate today with respect to a
long-lasting high tax rate in the future, and hence prefer to work more today.
Note that in some cases (infinitely elastic LS or zero mass of non-Ricardian
agents) output and hours can even decrease, which is due to the substitution
eﬀect dominating22. One other thing to note is the response of output and
inflation in Figure 5. While the inflation responses are very similar no matter
the deficit rule adopted, the output response is very diﬀerent and follows the
path of tax rates: with balanced budget, there is a small multiplier, but stays
persistently above zero. With deficit financing and a big response to debt, the
multiplier is much larger in the first periods, but actually becomes negative after
the tax process has reached its peak, for then it becomes optimal to postpone
work. Finally, in Figure 6 we vary parameters that we judged as crucial for
a positive consumption response with lump-sum taxation. Variations of the
same magnitude turn out not to be enough anymore, as expected. However,
a persistently positive consumption response can still be obtained by adopting
some combination of these three parameters (not reported).
6 Non-Keynesian eﬀects of fiscal policy
Some authors, starting with Giavazzi and Pagano 199023 have found that fiscal
consolidations (reductions in deficits, and especially spending cuts) may have
expansionary eﬀects on output and consumption: ’expansionary fiscal contrac-
tions’, or ’non-Keynesian’ eﬀects of fiscal policy. A variety of theoretical expla-
nations have been oﬀered (for a review see Perotti 1999). The model outlined
here is able to produce expansionary fiscal contractions (spending cuts) under
a particular scenario, i.e. in a non-Ricardian economy, whereby the share of
non-Ricardian agents is high enough to make the slope of the IS curve change
sign, or equivalently to make the WN locus less upward sloping than the LS
curve. In such a case the Inverted Taylor principle is a good guide for policy -
see Bilbiie 2003 for details and empirical evidence favoring such a view for the
US economy in the pre-Volcker era. In this parameterization, we change  = 05
and 5 = 08 with respect to the baseline.
We report results of cutting government spending by one commodity unit
22Note that such a situation can generate co-movement of consumption and hours, but both
would actually decrease, which is not observed in the data - see also Fatas and Mihov 2003
for a discussion in the standard RBC model.
23 See also Perotti 1999, Alesina Perotti and Tavares , etc.
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in Figures 7 and 8 (one for each financing scheme), varying the deficit rule
parameters as previously24. With lump-sum taxation, a cut in government
spending increases private consumption and output; notably, if the spending
cut is associated with a tax cut (and hence not a reduction in deficit), output
can actually decrease. When the response to debt is low, the fall in debt and
deficits (increase in surplus) is sustained, private consumption increases and the
eﬀcet on output is negligible. The intuition for such non-Kynesian eﬀects is
simple once one recognizes that shifts in the LS and WN curves are largely the
same as in a Ricardian economy (however, note opposite sign since government
spending decreases), except for two interrelated issues: the slope of the LS
curve is higher than that of WN, and the passive monetary policy rule makes
any increase in inflation be associated with a fall in the real rate, and an increase
in consumption of Ricardian agents. A shift of WN to the left now means an
increase in both wage and hours, keeping constant LS. Hours (and even wage)
can only decrease if LS shifts left too much, which is the case under the balanced-
budget experiment. Note, however, that a fiscal consolidation is a spending cut
leading to a fall in deficit rather than in taxes. With distortionary taxation, the
responses are very similar. However, even when the cut in spending leads to a
fall in the tax rate, output still increases.
Figures 7 and 8 here.
The eﬀects of fiscal policy switch sign once the value of the share of Non-
Ricardian agents switches (and implicitly, the policy response to inflation also
changes to make the model consistent with a unique equilibrium). The de-
scribed results depend on the interaction of two diﬀerent factors: low asset
market participation and a passive monetary policy rule. We are exploring the
empirical plausibility of such a scenario in explaining such non-Keynesian fiscal
policy eﬀects in current work.
7 Conclusion
Recent research has tried to explain why private consumption increases after
a positive government spending shock. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003)
augment a standard sticky price dynamic general equilibrium model with two
other key frictions: part of the agents do not smooth consumption and the labor
market is non-Walrasian in a specific sense. Namely, hours worked and wages
obey an ad-hoc schedule, and fluctuations in hours worked are independent
of wealth (and consumption smoothing). Under these assumptions, a deficit-
financed spending shock can generate an increase in consumption.
We have studied a model similar to GLV, but with distortionary taxation
and a Walrasian labor market, emphasizing the role of the labor market in the
transmission of fiscal policy. For each of the extreme cases of lump-sum and
distortionary taxation, we have reduced the model to a two-equation system
similar to the workhorse ’new synthesis’ model used in modern monetary policy
24Other variations similar to those found before preserved the same features and intuition
as the baseline case.
28
analysis. We emphasized the modifications induced upon dynamics by the pres-
ence of non-Ricardian agents and distortionary taxation. Given the simplicity
of these reduced-form systems, some researchers might find these of independent
interest.
In what concerns the response of macroeconomic variables to government
spending shocks, we find that in general it is very diﬃcult to obtain the positive
response of private consumption found in the data (see body text for details
and explanation of mechanism). This result is relatively more diﬃcult to obtain
with distortionary taxation. The three ways to obtain a positive and persistent
increase in consumption in the present framework are: if the spending shock
is not too persistent and/or the monetary response to inflation is low enough
and/or price stickiness is high enough. Most importantly, in the framework
presented here, even when a positive consumption response is obtained, it is
entirely driven by a strong positive response of the real wage. This in itself is not
a desirable feature of such models, since it is at odds both with the acyclicality of
the real wage and with the small conditional response of real wage to government
spending. The model gives too much role to cyclical movements in real wages
in explaining business cycle fluctuations, contradicting what Christiano and
Eichenbaum call Lucas’ less famous critique.
Finally, we have presented an alternative theoretical explanation of the ex-
pansionary eﬀects of fiscal consolidations on output and consumption. Our cur-
rent research investigates the empirical plausibility of this paper’s mechanism
(a structural change in asset markets participation and aggregate demand) to
underlie non-Keynesian eﬀects of fiscal policy.
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A Loglinearized equilibrium
Ricardian:
Euler equation, intratemporal and budget constraint (> are profits as a share
of steady-state GDP, > = − and 6 =
−

 ):
Note also that   is deviations of tax rate from its steady state value  
 [)+1]− ) = 4 − [/+1] (40)
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&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Non-Ricardian
Intratemporal and budget constraint:
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Firms:
- = (1 +  )& (45)
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- (47)
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Government:
Note 
 = 0 to simplify debt dynamics, + = −  ( =
−
  6+1 =
+1 
− 

 is real debt deflated by previous period’s price level to keep it
predetermined
6+1 = 6 + + − ( − - −   (49)
+ is an AR(1) exogeous process, we need two more equations for ( and   It
is useful to define the policy-relevant variable budget deficit  deviations from
steady state as percent of SS GDP:
 = + − ( − - −   (50)
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Note that here is automatic stabilization from distortionary taxation: when y is
high, deficit is low. First, we need a rule for the deficit, taken as in Woodford’s
4.4, also Gali et al, Leeper, etc.
 =
¡
1− 5
¢
+ − 56 (51)
5 gives the extent of deficit financing: when it is zero, spending is entirely
deficit-financed, when it is one it is tax- financed. 5 is there to make fiscal
policy locally Ricardian in the standard model. The foregoing says how tax
revenues adjust when spending modifies: we need one more equation to divide
the burden between the two types of taxation. The obvious extremes are (i) no
variation in the tax rate; (ii) no lump-sum instruments.
Market clearing
Labour market (& =labour demand by firms)
& =
	
	
& +
(1− )	
	
& (52)
Aggregate consumption is:
) =


) +
(1− )

) (53)
Aggregate resource constraint - equilibrium in goods market, holds by Walras’
law, and is redundant.
- =


) + + (54)
Monetary policy rule:
4 = 5/+! (55)
B Steady state
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
where  ≡ 1 + 4
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We assume hours are the same for the two groups in steady state only, 	 =
	 = 	 and the risk aversion to variations in leisure is also homogeneous
across groups,  =  = 
25. Then, for the loglinear budget constraints of
25From the intratemporal optimality conditions evaluated at the steady state,
 (1−	)− = (1− ) 1
	

this can be the case only if relative preference for leisure 
is diﬀerent across groups, such that consumption in steady state can also be diﬀerent. When
these latter are equal, preferences for leisure are also homogeneous.
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both agents the coeﬃcients are fully determined:
(1− ) 

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
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For simplification, let # =  so share of profits in steady-state  is zero,
consistent with evidence and arguments in i.a. Rotemberg andWoodford (1995),
and with the very idea that the number of firms is fixed in the long run. Assume
also 
 = 0 which makes:


=


=  = 1−  −  = 1−%
In this case the relative preference for leisure is also common to both agents.
C Derivations of the Wage Hours Locus
Derive wage-hours equilibrium locus, first expressing hours of Ricardian agents
as function of total hours and hours of non-Ricardian and using 60:
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We can now express consumption of Ricardian agents as a function of output:
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When there is no lump-sum taxation, consumption of Ricardian agents as a
function of output is:
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D Deriving the IS-AS system
We seek to express everything in terms of aggregate variables, and then use the
two dynamic equations to get dynamics only in terms of output, inflation and
interest rate. All derivations are detailed in the appendix. Let ' ≡ 3− 11−  
be after-tax real wage and note * = * = *. We first solve for hours and
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consumption of non-Ricardian as a function of after-tax real wage and lump-sum
transfers:
& = ( −% ) 
' + 
( (60)
) = [1− * ( −% ) 
]' − *
( (61)

 ≡ 1
1−  + * (1−% )
The equilibrium wage-hours locus locus is:
	 :
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+ (62)
We can now express consumption of Ricardian agents as a function of output
as:
)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We now have a relationship between forward-looking part of aggregate de-
mand (consumption of savers) and total aggregate demand. Note that we have
written the equation such that we emphasize that government spending has an
eﬀect on its own, and one through the mismatch between spending and taxes
+ − ( =  + - +   Substituting this we have
) = (, − .) - − . − .  +
: +
1
1−%
(. (1− )− 1) +
Now to the canonical form: we first derive the AS equation, noting 2) = 3 =
' +
1
1−   using the relation betwen output and after-tax real wage and the
NKPC in terms of marginal cost:
: 2) =
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The IS curve is obtained by replacing consumption in the Euler equation of
Ricardian agents:
: (, − .) [-+1 − -] = 4 − [/+1] + . [+1 − ] +
: +. [ +1 −  ]−
1
1−%
(. (1− )− 1) [++1 − +]
37
E Lump-sum taxation
In the first scenario, tax rates do not vary,   = 0 at all times, but tax revenues of
course vary automatically in response to cyclical conditions ( since  is diﬀerent
from zero) - this captures a realistic feature of budgets. Recalling that the
dynamics of deficit and debt are the same independently of the distortions, we
obtain the IS curve:
(, − .) [9+1 − 9] = (4 − [/+1]− 4∗ )
So as long as debt does not explode (FP locally Ricardian) −1 (1− 5) 7 1,
we need two explosive roots of the system :
9 = 9+1 −∆−1 (4 − [/+1]− 4∗ )
/ = /+1 + 09
4 = 5/+1
4∗ = given above as fct. of + 6
∗

Where ∆ ≡ , − . = 11− − . (1− )
³

1− +
1+
1+
´
. Note ∆ 7 0 iﬀ 1− 
1
#(1−)(+(1− ) 1+1+ )
  ¯ ≡ 1
1 + *
 (1− )
³
% + (1−% ) 1+1+
´ (64)
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Fig A:Threshold non-Ricardian share as function of inverse Frisch elasticity for
zero tax rate (dashed) and 0.3 (solid).
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F Endogenous tax rate variations
Suppose no lump-sum taxes are available
 = + − - −   =
¡
1− 5
¢
+ − 56
  = 5+ + 56 − -
We can now write the Philips curve in terms of the output deviation from
the natural level, 9 = - − -  First note that the deviations of the tax rate
from its flex-price level (the ’tax gap’):
  −  = −9 (65)
The New Philips curve and the IS curve are then (replacing 65 into ?? and
re-writing the Euler equation):
/ = /+1 + :9

  : = 1
µ
;− 
1− 
¶
9

+1 = 9

 + ,
−1 (4 −/+1 − 4 )
It is useful to write the dynamic system in terms of gaps of actual levels from
these ’eﬃcient’ levels. The output gap relative to the eﬃcient level in terms of
the output gap relative to the natural level is:
9 = 9

 − 
1−%
1−  


We can then write the system having as shocks the eﬃcient interest rate and
the natural level of the tax rate:
/ = /+1 + :9 + :
1−%
1−  


9+1 = 9 + ,
−1 (4 −/+1 − 4∗ ) + ,−1.
µ
1−  1−%
1− 
¶£


+1 − 
¤
This shows the specific way in which propagation of shocks is diﬀerent (along
with diﬀerences in coeﬃcients): a. shocks to tax rate under flexible prices act
as cost-puch shocks in the AS curve - this is independent of the share of non-
Ricardian agents; b. changes in tax rates under flexible prices act as shocks to
the IS curve - this is true only in the presence of non-Ricardian agents.
Determinacy properties: the transition matrix is now:µ ¡
1− −1:,−1 (5 − 1)
¢
,−1 (5 − 1)−1
−−1: −1
¶
,
Need eigenvalues be outside unit circle, trace: 1 −
$
% (5 − 1)+ 1, determi-
nant: 1 .
det− 4=)A = :
,
(5 − 1)− 1
det+ 4=)A =
2

− :
,
(5 − 1) + 1
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Figure 1:
CAse A: det− 4=)A  −1 det+ 4=)A  −1 so
:,−1 (5 − 1)  0
:,−1 (5 − 1) 7 2 (1 + )
Case B can be ruled out. So now even if ,−1 7 0 can have Taylor principle
hold (for ,−1  0 can have Inverted Taylor principle hold ) if : 7 0 that is

1− 

1+ +
1
1− ; : 
2%(1+)
−1
so
 

1+ +
1
1−
1 + 1+ +
1
1−
20151050
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Fig B: Threshold tax rate making slope of Philips curve change
However, this is empirically implausible (tax rates are only around 0.3 on average
- see Mendoza, Razin and Tesar).
G Figures
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Fig 1: Eﬀects of one unit shock to government spending under lump-sum
taxation, first set of parameters.
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Fig 2: Eﬀects of one unit shock to government spending under lump-sum
taxation, second set of parameters varies.
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Fig 3: Eﬀects of one unit shock to government spending under lump-sum
taxation, third set of parameters varies.
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Fig 4: Eﬀects of one unit shock to government spending under distortionary
taxation, first set of parameters varies.
44
Fig 5: Eﬀects of one unit shock to government spending under distortionary
taxation, second set of parameters varies.
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Fig 6: Eﬀects of one unit shock to government spending under distortionary
taxation, third set of parameters varies.
46
Fig 7: Non-Ricardian scenario: Eﬀects of fiscal consolidation (government
spending cut) under lump-sum taxation, deficit rule parameters vary.
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Fig 8: Non-Ricardian scenario: Eﬀects of fiscal consolidation (government
spending cut) under distortionary taxation, deficit rule parameters vary.
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